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Abstract
We use data from a repeated survey panel that was run with real online broker customers in
September 2008, December 2008, and March 2009. In all three surveys subjects’ risk attitudes, risk
expectations, return expectations, and risk taking behavior, i.e. the proportion of wealth they are
willing to invest into the stock market compared to a risk free asset, were elicited. Using this unique
dataset we analyze whether risk taking, risk attitudes, and expectations change from one quarter to
the other and whether the latter two have an impact on risk taking behavior. Our results indicate
that risk taking behavior decreases substantially from September to December and from December
to March. Similarly, risk expectations and return expectations also change substantially from one
survey to the next one. In contrast, various measures of risk attitudes are fairly stable over the time
periods. Interestingly, observed changes in risk taking behavior can primarily be attributed to changes
in risk and return expectations but not to changes in past performance or changes in risk attitudes.
Moreover, our findings are valuable for practitioners - who are urged by MiFID (2006) to elicit their
customers’ risk profiles and risk preferences - since we show that risk attitudes remain fairly stable and
that changes in investment behavior can mainly be attributed to changes in expectations. Lastly, we
illustrate that overconfidence seems to be a fairly stable construct between September and December
and tends to decrease slightly from December to March.
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1 Introduction
Both investment firms and researchers are eager to learn more about factors that influence
subjects’ risk taking behavior. In classic portfolio theory (see e.g. Markowitz (1952)) risk
taking is argued to depend mainly on individuals’ risk attitudes with the risk and return
of an investment being equated by historical returns and historical volatilities. However,
more general risk-value frameworks (see Sarin and Weber (1993), Weber (1997), and Jia
et al. (1999)) allow for heterogenous beliefs about the riskiness and the returns of an
investment and model subjects’ risk taking behavior as follows:
Risk Taking = f (Return Expectations, Risk Attitude, Risk Expectations) (1)
Hence, changes in risk taking behavior should be caused by changes in one or more of
these determinants of risk taking. Trying to incorporate this into the above equation we
reformulate equation 1 as follows:
∆Risk Taking = f(∆1 Return Expectations,∆2 Risk Attitude,∆3 Risk Expectations)
(2)
Both researchers and practitioners argue that risk taking behavior varies substantially
over time, i.e. from one point in time to the following. Commenting on the financial crisis
in September 2008 the New York Times assessed: “investors around the world frantically
moved their money into the safest investments, like Treasury bills”. Researchers analyzing
dynamics of risk taking behavior also argue that risk taking behavior can change substan-
tially over time (see e.g. Staw (1976), Thaler and Johnson (1990), Weber and Zuchel
(2005), and Malmendier and Nagel (2008)). However, it is still an unresolved question
what actually drives changes in risk taking behavior. In more general risk-value frame-
works, changes in risk taking can be due to changes in expectations or risk attitudes. Thus,
the main goal of this study is to analyze whether Return Expectations (∆1), Risk Attitudes
(∆2), or Risk Expectations (∆3) change over time and subsequently affect changes in Risk
Taking (∆).
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Knowing more about changes in the determinants of risk taking behavior is in particular
important because of the regulations of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID) by the European Parliament and the European Council (2004 and 2006). The
MiFID requires investment firms to obtain “information as is necessary for the firm to un-
derstand the essential facts about the customer (Article 35, 1)” and to elicit the customers’
“preferences regarding risk taking, his risk profile, and the purpose of the investment (Ar-
ticle 35, 4).” However, MiFID is not specific about how often investment advisors have
to elicit risk preferences and risk profiles. To close this gap we analyze in the following
whether risk attitudes or expectations of individuals change over time and whether these
changes have an impact on risk taking behavior.
The main data were gathered via repeated internet surveys which were conducted in
collaboration with the behavioral finance team at Barclays Wealth from September 2008
to March 2009. A big advantage of our study is that we use a unique dataset of real online
broker customers that includes information on the customers’ expectations, risk attitudes,
and risk taking behavior.
Selected customers of Barclays Wealth were asked to participate repeatedly in a question-
naire survey. The survey was run on a quarterly basis from September 2008 to March 2009.
Overall 617 subjects participated at least once in the three surveys. Of these 617 subjects,
287 participated once, 181 twice, and 149 thrice. In all three surveys we elicited amongst
others financial risk taking by asking subjects to divide an amount of £100.000 either into
the stock market (FTSE-All-Share) or into a risk free asset with a safe interest rate of
4%. We also elicited subjective risk attitudes using three questions of Barclays Wealth’s
psychometrically validated risk attitude scale. In addition, we elicited risk and return
expectations of subjects for their own portfolio and for the market (FTSE-All-Share).
Using survey data has some pros and cons. On the one hand, it has the disadvantage that
we do not observe actual behavior of people and that there might be potential selection
and response biases. On the other hand, a big advantage is that relevant variables can
be elicited in a clean environment and do not need to be indirectly inferred from actions
and that in contrast to choice data one does not need to maintain the strong assumption
that decision makers have objectively correct (i.e. rational) expectations (for an overview
of some pros and cons of survey data see Manski (2005)). Surveys asking for individuals’
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expectations and beliefs are very common1 and are highly influential both in academia
and practice.
Our results indicate that - consistent with evidence in the financial media and with findings
in the literature - risk taking behavior in the financial domain is indeed varying over time.
Risk taking is defined as the hypothetical amount subjects would invest into the stock
market and a risk free asset, respectively. Subjects invest substantially less into risky
assets in December than in September and also substantially less risky in March than
in December. More specifically, the percentage invested into the risky asset drops from
56.02% in September to 52.77% in December and to 46.52% in March. Analyzing the main
determinants of risk taking - risk attitudes as well as risk and return expectations - our
findings are twofold. First, risk attitudes seem to remain fairly stable as the risk attitude
score on a 7-point Likert scale changes from one survey to the other by more than 1 point
only for approximately 20% of all subjects. Second Wilcoxon signed-rank tests show that
risk and return expectations vary significantly from one survey to the other. Moreover, we
show that changes in risk taking can mainly be attributed to changes in risk and return
expectations and not to changes in risk attitudes. This result remains stable even if we
control for individual past performance. Finally, we compare changes in risk expectations
in relation to changes in actual risk, which is a measure of overconfidence. We show that
this measure of overconfidence seems to be fairly stable initially and decreases in the long
run.
These findings are important for practitioners in two ways: first, we show that risk atti-
tudes are stable individual constructs that do not need to be elicited on a quarterly basis.
Note that this line of argument cannot be generalized to all risk attitude measures cur-
rently used by practitioners. In particular inappropriate measures such as the ones that
confound risk attitudes and expectations do not need to be stable over time. Second, we
illustrate that subjective expectations are important determinants of risk taking behav-
1A non exclusive list of such surveys in the U.S. are the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) survey http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php?p=qnaires, the Survey of Economic Expectations http://www.
disc.wisc.edu/econexpect/Index.html, the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu,
the UBS/Gallup survey http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/datasets/ubs_investor.html, and the
Duke/CFO Business Outlook survey http://www.cfosurvey.org/duke. Two examples from Germany are the ZEW
Bankprognosen survey http://www.zew.de/de/publikationen/bankprognosen/index.php and the Socio-Economic Panel
http://www.diw.de/deutsch/soep/29004.html. Findings in some of these surveys are going to be discussed in section 2.
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ior and that it might be worthwhile for practitioners to elicit their clients’ expectations
regularly.
Our study extends findings in the empirical and experimental literature. Up to now, there
is no study documenting whether changes in expectations and/or changes in risk attitudes
drive changes in risk taking behavior. However, there are several papers analyzing whether
risk taking behavior actually changes over time. Malmendier and Nagel (2008) use real
world data to show that individuals’ personal experiences of macroeconomic shocks have
long-lasting effects on their risk taking behavior. In the experimental literature Staw
(1976) and Thaler and Johnson (1990) show that risk taking behavior can depend on
individual prior gains and losses. But both empirical and experimental studies are not
able to disentangle the channel through which individual risk taking behavior changes
over time; i.e. they are not able to analyze whether changes in risk taking behavior can
be attributed to changes in risk attitudes or expectations or both. In contrast, our data
basis allow us to explicitly analyze this issue for a sample of real bank customers.
Furthermore, most studies analyzing changes in expectations and risk attitudes inves-
tigate either changes in risk expectations (e.g. Weber and Milliman (1997)) or changes
in return expectations (e.g. Shiller et al. (1996)) or changes in risk attitudes (e.g. Sahm
(2007) and Klos (2008)) separately but not in one single study. Moreover, most of these
studies are not able to relate changes in expectations and risk attitudes to changes in risk
taking. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and Dominitz and Manski (2007) analyze the relation
between the probability of holding stocks and expected equity returns. Using large scale
survey data, they find that the probability of holding stocks is higher the higher expected
returns are. We extend their findings in two ways: first, they do not analyze changes in
expectations and consequently their influence on changes in risk taking behavior. Second,
they proxy for risk taking by the probability of holding stocks whereas we analyze asset
allocation decisions.
Another important advantage of our study is that the surveys we use in our paper were
conducted in early September 2008 (6-20), December 2008 (6-20), and March 2009 (21-
30). This unique dataset allows us to test if the turmoil on financial markets during this
period such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers had substantial effects on risk attitudes,
expectations, and risk taking behavior. In addition, using repeated survey data on real
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online broker customers to analyze changes in risk attitudes adds to the literature which
often relies on student populations (see e.g. Baucells and Villasis (2006) or Harrison
et al. (2005)) and offers substantial advantages. For example, we are able to control if
differences in past portfolio performance or changes in market conditions drive changes
in risk attitudes, expectations or risk taking behavior.
This paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we provide a literature review and formulate
our hypotheses. Section 3 presents information on survey respondents and on the sur-
vey design. The main results are reported in section 4 while the last section provides a
discussion of our results and a short conclusion.
2 Related Literature and Hypotheses
Anecdotal evidence suggests that risk taking behavior of investors, i.e. their division of
wealth between risky and risk free assets, can substantially vary over time and does not
need to be perfectly stable. According to the Deutsche Aktieninstitut in the year 2000, at
the height of the internet boom, 6.2 million people in Germany held part of their wealth in
stocks. By 2008, in the course of the financial crisis, this number had dropped to only 3.5
million. In a similar vein, the Wall Street Journal (2008) reports in an article on December
5, 2008 that in response to the dramatic events on financial markets “investors pulled $
72 billion from stock funds in October alone” and moved their money into government
bonds and cash holdings.
Thus, individuals risk taking behavior, i.e. their choice between risky and risk free as-
sets, seems not to be perfectly stable over time. This temporal instability can be due
to various factors: first, subjects do not need to exhibit the same level of risk aversion
over time. Second, individual risk expectations and return expectations do not need to be
stable and might be shaped by personal experiences. Third, important personal aspects
such as income and wealth might change over time. All these factors can individually or
jointly lead to changes in risk taking behavior over time. In the following we are going to
illustrate general findings in the literature on the stability or non-stability of risk taking
behavior. Subsequently, we are going to present more recent studies analyzing changes in
risk attitudes and expectations over time, before we pick up the question why changes in
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risk taking over time occur.
Earlier studies in decision analysis on the stability of risk preferences or risky choices seem
to confirm the anecdotal evidence. Camerer (1989) and Hey and Orme (1994) investigate
the short term temporal reliability and stability of risky choices. Both studies confront
subjects with the same set of choices at two points in time (less than 10 days apart).
Their results indicate that individuals change their risk taking behavior in 25%-30% of
all cases. However, these studies do not explicitly analyze the role of prior gains or losses
on subsequent risk taking behavior.
Staw (1976) analyzes exactly this and shows that risk taking behavior does not need
to be stable and substantially depends on prior personal outcomes. He illustrates that
subjects take significantly more risks following a loss than following a gain and terms this
“escalation of commitment”. The “escalation of commitment” hypothesis is also in line
with findings in the literature on the disposition effect (see e.g. Odean (1998) and Weber
and Camerer (1998)). On the other hand, Thaler and Johnson (1990) argue that it is
difficult to make generalizations about risk taking preferences. They show a reverse effect,
i.e. enhanced risk taking in the gain domain, in two stage gambles which they term the
“house money effect”. Weber and Zuchel (2005) conduct an in-depth analysis of the two
conflicting effects “escalation of commitment” and “house money effect” and show that
the framing of the situation is important when analyzing changes in risk taking behavior.
On the one hand, the “house money effect” is prevalent if a situation is framed as a lottery,
on the other hand, the “escalation of commitment” effect is predominant if the situation
resembles a portfolio investment.
These studies show that the personal experience of gains or losses in the past can influence
subsequent risk taking behavior. In a slightly related context Malmendier and Nagel (2008)
show that personal macroeconomic experiences seem to have a great impact on personal
decisions and on the risk taking behavior of individuals. They illustrate that subjects
who have experienced high inflation and bad market-returns throughout their lives invest
substantially less risky than subjects who have experienced excellent market-returns in
the course of their lives. However, they do explicitly state that their goal is not to analyze
whether changes in beliefs or in risk aversion or a mix of both drive observed differences
in risk taking behavior.
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Overall, the presented evidence suggests that subjects need not take constant levels of risks
in their investment decisions. Various factors such as changes in personal macroeconomic
experiences or gains and losses in own investments might affect risk taking behavior in a
dynamic setting. In a first step, we simply want to find evidence for the well-established
claim that risk taking behavior does not need to be stable in our survey for the sample
period September 2008 to March 2009. Consistent with the aforementioned anecdotal
evidence and findings in the literature we formulate hypothesis 1 as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Financial risk taking behavior varies over time
One important explanation for varying risk taking behavior over time often brought for-
ward are changes in income or wealth. The fact that an increase in wealth should result
in a higher level of risk taking or a decrease in relative risk aversion is a key implication
of various difference habits models. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) use microdata to an-
alyze this key implication of difference-habit models empirically. They show that wealth
changes affect the decision to participate in stock markets but that they have hardly any
effect on asset allocation decisions, i.e. on the proportion a household invests in risky and
risk free assets, respectively. In a similar vein, Guiso et al. (2003) analyze stock ownership
in major European countries and illustrate that the share of wealth invested in the stock
market is independent of investors’ wealth. Thus, both papers show that wealth effects
cannot explain observed changes in risk taking behavior over time.
In more general risk-value frameworks variations in financial risk taking behavior over
time can mainly be attributed to changes in risk and return expectations and/or changes
in risk attitudes (see equation 1 and 2). In the following, we will review some more recent
findings in the empirical and experimental literature on long run changes in risk attitudes
and changes in expectations over time.
Changes in risk attitudes:
Studies analyzing long term changes in risk attitudes by confronting the same set of sub-
jects with the same set of questions can be roughly classified into two groups. First, studies
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using data from large scale panel surveys such as the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) or the
Michigan Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) which mostly use self-assessment tasks
with answer possibilities on Likert-scales. Second, laboratory and field experiments using
lottery related tasks to elicit risk attitudes and subsequently, changes in risk attitudes.
Using data from simple 11-point self-assessment tasks from the SOEP waves in 2004 and
2006, Klos (2008) analyzes the temporal stability of risk attitude measures. He shows
that individual risk attitudes tend to be fairly stable over time and that the effect is in
particular strong for those subjects that indicated the central category. Similarly, Sahm
(2007) finds evidence for persistent differences between individuals but relatively high
stability of risk attitudes within individuals over time using the HRS panel data set with
more than 12,000 observations.
Andersen et al. (2008) use a field experiment with a representative sample of the Danish
population and Harrison et al. (2005) a laboratory study with students to analyze the
temporal stability of risk attitudes. Both studies obtain subjects’ risk aversion measures
using a multiple price list approach (see e.g. Holt and Laury (2002)). They find only slight
variation of risk attitudes over time and conclude that risk attitudes seem to be a stable
construct. In addition, Baucells and Villasis (2006) find similar results in a laboratory
study in which they elicit risk attitudes using binary lottery choice tasks. They also find
only small deviations in risk attitudes over time and argue that most of these changes
disappear if one introduces noise.
Overall, evidence in research implies that risk attitudes seem not to change too much over
the course of time and that observed changes can mainly be attributed to errors. Hence,
our hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 2: Risk attitudes are fairly stable over time
Changes in risk and return expectations:
The original formulation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a static one-period
model that assumes homogenous expectations (see e.g. Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)).
Subsequent studies extended these assumptions by considering heterogenous beliefs, time-
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varying expectations, and a dynamic investment problem of rational investors (see e.g.
Merton (1973) and Miller (1977)). In contrast, behavioral approaches argue that some
subjects misinterpret the informational content of a new signal and adjust their expecta-
tions inappropriately. Consequently, they over- or underreact to new information because
of their biased expectations (see for an overview DeBondt (2000)). Both rational and
behavioral studies agree that risk and return expectations can vary between subjects and
also within subjects over time when new information comes into the market.
Changes in return expectations have been analyzed extensively in the empirical and ex-
perimental literature, mostly with repeatedly carried out large scale surveys. Dominitz
and Manski (2005) analyze the dynamics of expectations in the Survey of Economic Ex-
pectations (1999-2001) and in the Michigan Survey of Consumers (2002-2004). They find
that expectations are not perfectly stable over time but that differences between persons
are larger than differences within persons over time.
Using a series of cross-section UBS/Gallup surveys, Fisher and Statman (2002) and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) show that subjects’ long and short term expectations change
substantially over the course of time. Taking data from the 1998-2003 surveys, Vissing-
Jorgensen (2003) illustrates that average 1-year expectations vary substantially from a
high of 15.8% in January 2000 to a low of around 6% at the end of 2002. She argues that
expectations and actual returns almost seem to move together. Analyzing the crash in the
Japanese stock market Shiller et al. (1996) illustrate that a sharp drop in expectations for
long run earnings growth could be observed for the period 1989-1994. They argue that
changes in expectations probably have substantial economic effects but do not provide
direct and unambiguous evidence on this issue.
Using a between-subjects design, Glaser and Weber (2005) demonstrate that return ex-
pectations after September 11 and the following market downturn are significantly higher
than return expectations before the event indicating that subjects did believe in some
sort of mean reversion. However, they note that there is no unambiguous ex ante predic-
tion whether subjects will expect mean reversion or trend continuation in stock prices in
response to such a dramatic event.
Risk perception or risk expectations are also often argued to be based on individuals’ past
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experiences of a similar event or situation (see e.g. Ricciardi (2004)). In a similar vein,
Loewenstein et al. (2001) hypothesize that decisions are evaluated at an emotional level
and that prior outcomes, good as well as bad ones, influence this emotional level and the
way individuals perceive the risk of a situation.
Consistent with these hypotheses, Weber and Milliman (1997) and Mellers et al. (1997)
experimentally show that risk perceptions change significantly over time after subjects
have experienced either good or bad outcomes. More precisely, they show that risk atti-
tudes are almost perfectly stable if one controls for changes in risk perceptions. Similarly,
Glaser and Weber (2005) find that volatility estimates are significantly higher after the
terror attacks of September 11 than before.
Overall, the evidence in the literature indicates that both risk and return expectations
can vary substantially over time as they can e.g. be influenced by macroeconomic devel-
opments or individually experienced gains and losses. However, to come up with a general
hypothesis whether risk and return expectations should rise or fall in response to the
dramatic events in late 2008 is difficult. Hence, hypothesis 3 follows:
Hypothesis 3: Expectations vary over time
On the one hand, the presented evidence at the start of this section indicates that financial
risk taking behavior does not need to be constant over the course of time and may vary
given prior gains and losses or given macroeconomic changes. On the other hand, risk and
return expectations - two major determinants of risk taking in risk-value models - have
also been shown to vary over time, whereas risk attitudes seem to be fairly stable. Our
data allow us to test explicitly what actually drives changes in risk taking. Consistent
with the previously presented literature we assume that changes in risk taking over time
are mainly driven by changes in risk and return expectations and not by changes in risk
attitudes or past performance.2
2Note that the goal of this study is not to test whether changes in risk and return expectations are based on rational
motives or whether they are due to irrational motives such as misreaction to new information.
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3 Data
3.1 Survey Respondents
Our analysis is based on a repeated questionnaire study that was run as part of a joint
collaborative research project with the behavioral finance team at Barclays Wealth in
September 2008, December 2008, and March 2009. About 90% of all subjects in the
September sample completed the survey before September 12, i.e. before the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent downturn on financial markets. Unfortunately,
we do not have explicit information on the specific date each individual has completed
the survey.
Before the September wave, a stratified sample of Barclays Stockbrokers ’ client base was
drawn. To accomplish stratification, we grouped subjects according to their Age, Number
of deals per year, Number of holdings, and Portfolio value into non-overlapping subgroups,
so called strata. This procedure was used to improve the representativeness of the sample
and in order to take care of our collaborating bank’s desire to undersample subjects
who trade very little (Number of deals per year≤1) or have a relatively low portfolio value
(Portfolio value< £1,000). Thus, in all strata in which subjects were included that traded
less than once a year or had a portfolio value of less than £1,000 a lower percentage of
subjects were invited to participate in the survey than in the remaining strata. Note that
although we did undersample, we did not exclude these subjects totally as still more than
16% of all approached individuals had a portfolio value below £1,000.
Overall, 19,251 clients were emailed and invited to participate in a repeated survey. This
equals approximately 5% of all customers. Of the 19,251 individuals that were approached
by email in late August/early September 2008 about 4,520 (23%) opened the email. Of
those that opened the email, 849 (20%) went to the website and in the end, 479 out of
these 849 subjects completed the survey in September. The response rate is slightly lower
but still in the same ballpark as in similar studies by Dorn and Huberman (2005, 4%)
and Glaser and Weber (2007, 7%). Both studies also sent an email to customers of an
online broker and asked them to participate in an online questionnaire. It took subjects
on average 24 minutes to answer the survey.
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The 479 subjects who participated in September were contacted again by email in late
November/early December 2008 and invited to participate in a shorter version of the ques-
tionnaire.3 Overall, 240 of the 479 subjects participated for a second time in December.
In addition, Barclays Wealth sent out an email to further 700 customers that had not
been contacted yet, in order to increase the number of subjects in future surveys.4 This
resulted in an additional 138 subjects joining the panel in December. These 138 subjects
received the same questionnaire that was filled out by the 479 subjects in September and
not the shorter December version. In March 2009, all 617 subjects that had previously
participated in at least one round were contacted again and invited to participate in a fur-
ther study. This time all subjects received the same, shorter version of the questionnaire.
Overall, 287 subjects participated only once (214 in September and 73 in December) and
149 subjects participated in all three surveys. Of the remaining 181 subjects who partic-
ipated twice, 91 participated in September and December, 65 in December and March,
and 25 in September and March.
The main goal of the study is to analyze whether risk taking behavior, risk attitudes,
and expectations change from September to December and from December to March and
what might drive these changes. To analyze this we want to compare on an individual
level subjects’ responses to survey questions at the three points in time. In contrast to
previous studies using one-time survey responses from online broker customers (see e.g.
Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Glaser and Weber (2007)) our dataset consists of repeated
observations and allows us to analyze changes in the main variables. However, an analysis
of individual changes in the main variables is only possible for subjects that took part at
least in two consecutive surveys, i.e. in September and in December or in December and
March or in all three surveys. 240 subjects participated both in September and December
and 214 subjects participated both in December and March. In addition, 149 subjects
participated in all three surveys.
To address a potential selection bias we compare the overall adult British population with
3In contrast to the second version of the questionnaire we elicited in the first, longer version demographics, further
individual characteristics and various behavioral client profiling questions. These questions are psychometrically validated
and used by Barclays Wealth within the advisory process.
4These 700 had previously participated in another marketing related event of Barclays Wealth and had indicated their
willingness to participate in surveys.
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survey participants and we also compare subjects who participated once with those that
participated twice and thrice, respectively. Table 1 illustrates mean scores of demographics
and further characteristics for various groups. The first two columns illustrate mean scores
for all participants of our study (Groupall) and for the adult British population (GBall),
respectively. The next three columns illustrate the same scores separately for subjects
that participated only once (Grouponce, N=287), twice (Grouptwice, N=181), and subjects
that participated in all three surveys (Groupthrice, N=149).
The average age of all survey participants is 51.65 with two thirds of the subjects aged
between 40 and 66; four years older than the average British adult. In addition, subjects
in our sample are more likely to be married (0.65 vs. 0.52) or male (0.93 vs 0.49) compared
to the British average. Gross income is highly skewed with an overall mean of £76,615.73
and an overall median of £55,000 and substantially larger than for the average Briton
(£30,000). Clearly, our subjects are not likely to be representative of the typical British
adult. However, we find a considerable variation in subject’s answers which allows us
to test our hypotheses. In addition, our finding that respondents to this kind of survey
are predominately male and have a substantially larger gross income than the overall
population is consistent with Dorn and Huberman (2005).
Comparing subjects that participated once (Grouponce), twice (Grouptwice), and thrice
(Groupthrice), respectively, we find hardly any differences for the three subgroups. Only
for the level of investable wealth that is measured in 9 categories from 1 (£0 - £10,000)
to 9 (> £ 1 million) we find significant differences between the subgroups. Subjects
that participated only once in the survey have a substantially lower investable wealth
than subjects who participated thrice. Moreover subjects who participated thrice indicate
higher wealth levels than those who participated twice. Since the main goal of our study
is to analyze changes in various variables on an individual level over time, differences in
wealth between the three subgroups should not be problematic.
After having introduced the main variables in the following subsection, we are going to
analyze whether the three groups of subjects (Grouponce, Grouptwice, and Groupthrice)
differ in their response behavior in subsection 3.3.
Insert table 1 here
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3.2 Survey Design
This subsection presents the main variables that were elicited repeatedly within the sur-
veys. All surveys were designed in close collaboration with the behavioral finance team
at Barclays Wealth in order to get a better understanding of investors’ behavior. Besides
demographics and further individual characteristics that were described above and col-
lected only in the first survey in which a subject participated we elicited the following
variables repeatedly. The main variables are summarized in table 2.
(Financial) Risk taking: In the hypothetical risk taking task subjects were asked to
invest an amount of £100.000 either into the stock market (FTSE-All-Share) or into a
risk free asset with a safe interest rate of 4%. The higher the amount subjects allocate
to the stock market the more risk are they willing to take in this hypothetical task. A
big disadvantage of real transaction data is that it is hardly possible to obtain complete
information on total asset holdings of individuals at all banks at which they have an
account. Thus, although hypothetical risk taking is only an indirect proxy of risk taking
behavior it is a measure for which we have all necessary information.
Risk attitudes: In the September and December surveys we use three questions from
Barclays Wealth’s 8-question psychometric scale to assess subjects’ risk attitudes. Brooks
et al. (2008) show that this scale efficiently differentiates individuals from low risk toler-
ance to high risk tolerance and that the scale has high levels of reliability and validity.
The three questions used in our study can be found in table 2. For all three questions we
used a 7-point Likert scale with the endpoints “1 = Strongly Disagree” and “7 = Strongly
Agree”.5 In the March survey only one of these three risk attitude measures was elicited
(Risk Attitude 2 ). We do not elicit risk attitudes from lotteries because of the extended
domain specificity result in Nosic´ and Weber (2007) who show that risk attitudes inferred
from lotteries are not related to investment behavior in stocks.
5Amongst others Bollen and Barb (1981), Cicchetti et al. (1985), Preston and Colman (2000), Alwin and Krosnick (1991),
and Weng (2004) show that reliability, validity, and discriminating power increases up to 7-point scales and that after this
additional effects can hardly be observed. Moreover, Viswanathan et al. (2004) argue that the number of categories should
be picked such that it is as close as possible to a natural number of categories for a specific question and that one shouldn’t
use too many scales as this overburdens subjects and is too hard of a cognitive task for them. Hence, using 7-point Likert
scales seems to be the best trade-off between understandability and reliability for our sample of Barclays Wealth customers.
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Expected return and expected risk: Since we have argued in sections 1 and 2 that
subjective risk and return expectations are important determinants of risk taking behav-
ior, we tried to elicit them extensively in the questionnaire. To do this we elicited subjects
three months expectations for their own portfolio as well as for the overall stock market
(FTSE-All-Share). We chose the three months forecasting period because the survey panel
is also conducted on a quarterly basis. Since Nosic´ and Weber (2007) have shown that risk
expectations elicited on a purely subjective scale need not to coincide with risk expecta-
tions elicited via confidence intervals, we utilize both qualitative and numeric approaches
to measure subjects’ expectations.
To measure risk and return expectations numerically we asked individuals to state a best
guess (mean estimate) for the three month return as well as upper and lower bounds for
90% confidence intervals for the return in three months. More precisely, we asked them to
submit what they consider to be lower and upper bounds so that there is only a 5% chance
that the return in three months will be below the lower bound and a 5% chance that it will
be higher than the upper bound. Numeric return expectations for the market (Market-
Return-Num.) or for a subject’s own portfolio (Own-Return-Num.) are simply equal to the
best guess for the return of the market and for the own portfolio, respectively. However,
to obtain a measure of numeric risk expectations is not as straightforward. We use the
two point approximation suggested in Keefer and Bodily (1983) which transforms stated
confidence intervals into volatility estimates and has been widely used in the empirical
literature (e.g. Graham and Harvey (2005), Ben-David et al. (2007), and Glaser et al.
(2007)). This transformation gives us the two risk expectation measures Market-Risk-
Num. and Own-Risk-Num.
To get the two qualitative measures of return expectations (Market-Return-Subj. and
Own-Return-Subj.) we ask subjects to classify both expected market and own portfolio
returns on a 7-point Likert scale with the endpoints “1 = Extremely bad return” and
“7 = Extremely good return”. Similarly, the qualitative measures of risk expectations
(Market-Risk-Subj. and Own-Risk-Subj.) are obtained by asking subjects to classify both
expected market and own portfolio risk on a 7-point Likert scale with the endpoints “1
= Not risky at all” and “7 = Extremely risky”.
Past performance: We use the following approach to control for the possibility that past
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investment returns affect changes in risk taking behavior. We elicit individuals’ subjective
estimates of past performance, both past stock markets performance (FTSE-All-Share)
and past own portfolio performance within the last three months on a repeated basis.
Similar to expectations we use two elicitation methods. First, we ask subjects to give us a
numerical estimate of their own past returns or the stock markets past return in percent.
Second, we ask subjects to judge past returns on 7-point Likert scales with the endpoints
“1 = Extremely bad return” and “7 = Extremely good return”. In addition, we also ask
subjects to indicate their past performance at other online brokers, if applicable.
Insert table 2 here
3.3 Differences in Groups
In the following, we analyze the selection bias problem and in this connection in particular
the question if subjects that participated once, twice, and thrice, respectively, differ in
their response style to the repeatedly elicited variables. Overall, we have 17 repeatedly
elicited variables in September and December (and 15 in March): 1 · risk taking, 3 · risk
attitude (1 · risk attitude in March), 8 · expectations, and 5 · past performance. The mean
and median values for all variables in a given month are very similar between the three
groups of subjects: Grouponce, Grouptwice, and Groupthrice.
We use a series of Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests to analyze whether the response behavior
in the separate groups differs significantly. Comparing responses of Grouponce subjects in
September and December with those of subjects that participated repeatedly (Grouptwice
and Groupthrice) we find that only for 3 out of 34 variables there are statistically signif-
icant differences. Similarly, comparing subjects that participated twice with those that
participated thrice, we only find significant differences for 3 out of 49 variables.6 In addi-
tion, the few significant differences are scattered over various variables with no clear-cut
uniform effect. Hence, we argue that there is no indication that subjects who participated
once differ substantially in their response behavior from those that participated twice or
thrice. In addition, the same seems to be true if we compare subjects that participated
6We compare response behavior of subjects that participated twice and thrice, respectively, for 17 variables in September,
17 variables in December, and 15 variables in March. This gives us a total of 49 comparisons.
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twice and thrice directly.
4 Results
4.1 On the stability of risk taking, risk attitudes and expectations
This subsection analyzes if risk taking, risk attitude, expectations, and past performance
are stable individual traits or whether they change over our three observation periods.
Thus, we compare the response behavior in September with the one in December and the
one in December with the one in March. Table 3 reports mean scores of all repeatedly
elicited variables in our sample, separately for the three months. We report mean values
in each of the three months only for subjects that participated at least twice in the
survey, however, our results are essentially the same if we compute the numbers for all
617 subjects or for the 149 subjects that participated thrice. The last two columns in
table 3 report results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests analyzing whether the difference
between the two respective months is significant. To avoid the problem that differences in
repeatedly elicited variables are driven by the fact that different subjects participated in
separate months, we run these tests only for those subjects that participated in the two
respective months.
For Risk-Taking we observe, consistent with hypothesis 1, that the share subjects are
willing to invest into the market (FTSE-All-Share) varies substantially. It decreases from
56.02% in September to 52.77% in December to 46.52% in March. All differences are
highly significant at the 1% level.
Changes in risk attitudes are hardly observable for all three risk attitude measures. Risk
Attitude 2 and Risk Attitude 7 are virtually the same in September and in December. Risk
Attitude 6 rises slightly from 4.43 to 4.61 from September to December. This difference
is significant at the 5% level. However, this rise indicates that subjects seem to be less
risk averse in December than in September which is seemingly at odds with our previous
finding on lower levels of risk taking behavior in December. Since we only elicited Risk
Attitude 2 in March we can just analyze the change of this risk attitude measure from
December to March. Table 3 shows that Risk Attitude 2 decreased slightly from 3.63 to
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3.55 in this time period with the decrease being not significant. In addition, analyzing the
stability of risk attitudes on an individual level, we find that around 40% of all subjects
do not change self-reported risk attitudes at all and that around 80% of all subjects do
not change their self-reported risk attitude score by more than one point on the 7-point
Likert scales. This stability of risk attitudes is consistent with findings in Sahm (2007)
and Baucells and Villasis (2006) as well as with hypothesis 2.
Risk expectations or risk perceptions on the other hand, seem to change considerably over
time. On the one hand, all four risk expectation measures Market-Risk-Num., Market-
Risk-Subj., Own-Risk-Num., and Own-Risk-Subj. are substantially higher in December
than in September. On the other hand, Own-Risk-Num. is substantially lower in March
than in December. All differences are highly significant on the 1% level. More precisely,
both numerical risk measures or three month volatility estimates (Market-Risk-Num. and
Own-Risk-Num.) rise from approximately 0.05 in September to 0.075 in December and
drop slightly to around 0.07 in March.7 The extreme rise of volatility estimates from
September to December is consistent with Glaser and Weber (2005) who show in a
between-subjects design that volatility estimates before 9/11 were substantially lower
than after 9/11. In a similar vein, subjective risk expectations also rise substantially from
September to December and remain almost stable from December to March. These find-
ings indicate that subjects perceived both their own investments and investments into the
market to be riskier in December than in September and that they perceived Own-Risk-
Num. to be lower in March than in December. These changes in risk expectations are also
in line with hypothesis 3.
For return expectations a similar picture emerges. For all return expectations measures
(Market-Return-Num., Market-Return-Subj., Own-Return-Num., and Own-Return-Subj.)
subjects expect on average higher returns in December than in September. The same is
true if we compare return expectations in March and in December, indicating that subjects
became more and more optimistic over the three time periods. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
show that four of eight return expectations turn out to rise significantly (p< 0.01) from one
quarter to the other. Overall, consistent with Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and Shiller et al.
(1996) as well as with hypothesis 3, we show that return expectations do vary substantially
7We will compare this change in volatility estimates with actual changes in market risk in subsection 4.3 in more detail.
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over time. More specifically, in our sample subjects get more and more optimistic over
time.
Analyzing changes in past performance, we obtain a simple result. Most subjects judge
past performance, be it their own or the markets’ performance, from June to August
and from December to March to be substantially higher than the performance in the
time span September to December. This result is not surprising considering the fact
that stock markets took a severe downturn in the last quarter of 2008. The performance
of the FTSE-All-Share from September to December was approximately -20% and thus
substantially worse than the performance in the time periods June to September (-10%)
and December to March (-7%). Two interesting findings on subjects self-assessed past
performance emerge: first, subjects numerical estimates of past market performance are
not too far-off real market returns. Second, subjects judge their own past performance to
be lower than the market performance, although they do not expect their own portfolio
to be more risky than the market.
Our main findings are in line with previous findings in the literature and with our hy-
potheses 1 - 3. Risk taking behavior (see Malmendier and Nagel (2008)), risk expectations
(see Glaser and Weber (2005)), and return expectations (see Vissing-Jorgensen (2003))
seem to vary over time whereas risk attitudes tend to be fairly stable (see Sahm (2007)).
Moreover, our results remain stable if we analyze differences only for those subjects that
participated thrice or if we include all observations at each point of time.
Insert table 3 here
4.2 What Drives Changes in Risk Taking?
Having provided evidence for changes in risk taking behavior and expectations as well
as evidence for relative high stability of risk attitudes we want to analyze what actually
influences changes in risk taking behavior over time. As a first test of the functional
relationship in equation 1 and 2 we analyze whether subjects’ behavior is in accordance
with the model propositions. Hence, we study whether subjects that take more risks in
December (March) than in September (December) (∆ R.T.+) become less risk averse,
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expect higher returns and/or perceive the risk of an investment in the market to be lower.
And for subjects that take less risks in December (March) than in September (December)
(∆ R.T.−) we analyze whether they become more risk averse, expect lower returns and/or
perceive the risk of an investment in the market to be higher.
A simple sign test indicates that 74 subjects in the period September to December and
99 subjects in the period December to March take less (more) risks over time although
they become less (more) risk averse. We also find that 77 [64] subjects take more (less)
risks although they expect numerical and subjective market returns to be lower (higher)
in December than in September [in March than in December]. Finally, our results also
indicate that 55 [67] subjects take more (less) risks although they perceive the riskiness of
the market (numerical and subjective) to be higher (lower) in December than in September
[in March than in December].
However, these numbers do not indicate that subjects behave not according to the model.
It might well be that subjects who are less risk averse in December than in September [in
March than in December] take a substantially lower level of risks because of lower return
expectations and/or higher risk expectations. Hence, only those subjects that take more
(less) risks although they are more (less) risk averse, expect lower (higher) returns and
perceive the risk to be higher (lower) in December than in September [in March than in
December] do not behave in accordance with the functional form.
Our results indicate that subjects do not behave in accordance with the functional form
and thus violate some sort of dominance concept in less than 8.8% of all cases. If we assume
that the probability to submit non intuitively correct risk attitude, risk expectations, and
return expectations to be 1
2
, respectively, then about 12.5% (1
2
· 1
2
· 1
2
) of all subjects should
not behave in accordance with the functional form. Since our results indicate this to be
slightly lower, we interpret our findings as a first hint for the usefulness of more general
risk-value frameworks (see Sarin and Weber (1993) and Jia et al. (1999)).
Admittedly, the previous test is a weak test of model consistency and doesn’t allow us to
make inferences about what actually drives changes in risk taking behavior. To improve on
this we analyze in table 4 the value of all risk attitude, expectation, and past performance
measures separately for the two time periods September to December (left panel) and
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December to March (right panel). In each panel we report mean values of all variables
for two distinct groups of subjects: first, subjects who take more risks from one survey
to the next one (∆ R.T.+) and second, subjects who take less risks from one survey to
the next one (∆ R.T.−). The last column in each panel reports results on Mann-Whitney
rank-sum tests comparing the two groups ∆ R.T.+ and ∆ R.T.−.
Comparing changes in risk attitudes between the two groups shows hardly any differences
for both panels.8 Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests indicate that there is no significant rela-
tion between the way subjects adjust their risk attitude scores over time and changes in
their risk taking behavior over time.
In addition, analyzing whether there are any differences in the way subjects update their
own portfolio expectations between the two groups we mostly find no significant differences
as changes in own portfolio expectations are fairly similar for both groups (∆ R.T.+ and ∆
R.T.−). The only significant difference between the two groups of subjects can be observed
for Diff. Own-Risk-Num. in the December to March panel. Subjects who take more risks
in March than in December (∆ R.T.+) expect their own portfolio returns to be higher in
March than in December whereas subjects that take less risks in March than in December
(∆ R.T.−) expect their own portfolio returns to be lower in March than in December.
This result is not highly significant and gets insignificant if we only analyze the subgroup
of subjects that has participated in all three surveys.
Interestingly, there are no significant differences between the two groups (∆ R.T.+ and ∆
R.T.−) for Diff. Market-Return-Num. and Diff. Market-Risk-Num. in both panels. Diff.
Market-Return-Num. is simply the numerical return estimate in December (March) minus
the one in September (December) and positive in both groups and panels. Our results are
the same if we calculate the numerical variables not as simple differences but as percentage
changes. A similar picture emerges if we analyze Diff. Market-Risk-Num.
However, for subjective market risk and market return expectations we find substantial
and stable differences between the two groups. Subjects who take more risks from one
survey to the next one (∆ R.T.+) expect subjective market returns (Diff. Market-Return-
8Note that Diff. Risk Attitude 6 and Diff. Risk Attitude 7 were not elicited in March. Therefore, we cannot analyze
changes in these variables from December to March.
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Subj.) to become substantially higher over time and grow by on average 0.395 and 0.509,
respectively. Whereas subjects who take less risks in December than in September or less
risks in March compared to December (∆ R.T.−) expect subjective market returns to stay
fairly stable over time. Differences in differences between the two groups are significant in
both panels as indicated by z-scores of 2.024 and 2.468 and a first indication that changes
in subjective market return expectations seem to be related to changes in investment
behavior. This result remains stable even if re-run the analysis only for subjects that
participated in all three surveys.
We find a reverse pattern for subjective market risk expectations: subjects in the group ∆
R.T.− expect Diff. Market-Risk-Subj. to be positive on average (0.555 and 0.02) whereas
subjects in the group ∆ R.T.+ expect it to be negative on average (-0.052 and -0.2). The
difference in differences in the September to December panel is highly significant with a
z-score of -3.35. In contrast, the difference in differences in the December to March panel
is in the right direction but not significant. Moreover, table 4 also shows that changes in
past performance estimates are hardly related to changes in risk taking behavior as only
Diff. Past Perf. Self Subj. is significantly different for both groups.
These findings are first indications that changes in subjective market return and market
risk expectations seem to be related to changes in investment behavior in markets. How-
ever, one problem of the previous analyses is that we can only apply it to subjects who
take more or less risks from one period to the other. Thus, we omit all subjects that take
the same level of risk in two subsequent periods. The following analyses try to alleviate
this problem.
Insert table 4 here
In order to investigate the question what drives changes in risk taking behavior in more
depth we use multivariate tobit regressions. We use tobit since our variables are censored
from below (-100) and from above (+100). In table 5 we report results of clustered tobit
regressions of changes in risk taking, from one point in time to the next one. Since we use
both changes from September to December and changes from December to March in these
analyses we need to drop Diff. Risk Attitude 6 and Diff. Risk Attitude 7 as they were not
elicited in March. In addition, we also need to take into account that our observations do
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not need to be independent as 149 subjects participated in all three surveys and appear
repeatedly in our sample of differences. We control for this by clustering our regressions
over subjects.
The results in the first regression of table 5 indicate that Diff. Risk Attitude 2 cannot
explain changes in risk taking behavior. Interestingly, our results hold even if we re-run
the regressions and exclude subjects that report the same risk attitude in September and
in December or the same risk attitude in December and March.
Column 2 of table 5 illustrates that in contrast to changes in risk attitudes, changes in
subjective expectations can explain changes in risk taking behavior. More precisely, the
positive coefficient of 2.348 indicates a positive relation between Diff. Market-Return-
Subj. and Diff. Risk Taking. The larger the market return expectations in December
(March) are compared to September (December), the larger is the level of risk taking
in December (March) compared to September (December). For changes in subjective
market risk expectations (Diff. Market-Risk-Subj.) we find a reverse effect, indicated by
the significantly negative coefficient of -2.208. Hence, the higher subjects’ perceive the
risk of the market in December (March) in comparison to September (December) the less
risky they invest in December (March) compared to September (December). Our results
remain essentially the same if we further require that Diff. Risk Attitude 2 is not equal
to zero.
In additional robustness tests we check whether our results also hold for the numerical
risk and return expectations. Running the same regressions with numerical expectations
instead of ordinal ones, we find that changes in numerical expectations cannot explain
changes in risk taking behavior. This result remains stable even if we check for robustness
by e.g. running the regressions separately for subjects that participated twice and thrice,
respectively, or for those subjects that indicated certain levels of income or wealth, or for
those that stated positive expected returns. This finding is consistent with first results in
table 4 and in contrast to Nosic´ and Weber (2007) who show in their experiment with
business and economics students that risk taking behavior can be heavily influenced by
subjective numerical risk and return expectations.
We can only hypothesize why we do not find a significant effect for the numerical variables
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in our dataset: first, in numerical values outliers such as an expected market return of
143% in three months which we actually observe in our dataset could affect our results.9
Second, practitioners argue that ordinal ratings are more feasible and that most individu-
als with no specific background in economics seem to understand subjective ordinal ratings
better than numerical ones. Thus, e.g. all rating agencies transform default probabilities
or expected losses into ordinal scales. Since subjects in our study do not necessarily have
a background in finance or economics this argument might be relevant for our dataset.
Third, scanning the personal comments that subjects could submit after the March sur-
vey we find that many subjects regard the numerical questions to be too technical and
confusing to answer. A further indication that subjects had problems stating numerical
risk and return expectations is the fact that almost 23% (September), 24% (December),
and 17% (March) of all subjects expect three month market (FTSE-All-Share) returns to
be negative. Similarly, 9% (September), 13% (December), and 6% (March) of all subjects
expect their own portfolio to generate negative returns. Although they expect negative
market returns, most of these subjects allocate a positive amount of their money in the
hypothetical risk taking task into the market.10
The third regression tests whether our findings prevail if we analyze changes in subjective
market expectations and Diff. Risk Attitude 2 as independent variables jointly. Our main
results remain stable. In the fourth and fifth column we include numerical expectations,
past market performance, and various demographics as additional independent variables.
Multicollinearity is no issue for the numerical expectations since the correlation between
numerical and subjective risk and return expectations is relatively low, consistent with
findings in Nosic´ and Weber (2007). However, multicollinearity becomes an issue if we try
to include both past market performance measures at the same time. To avoid this problem
we include Diff. Past Perf. Market Num. in regression four and Diff. Past Perf. Market
Subj. in regression five, separately. Our main results with regard to expectations remain
stable as both Diff. Market-Risk-Subj. and Diff. Market-Return-Subj. are still significant
determinants of Diff. Risk Taking.
9Note that this reasoning alone cannot explain the entire finding as it remains stable, even if we winsorize the data.
10An in depth analysis of why some subjects state negative expected returns and still invest into a portfolio is certainly
interesting but not the scope of the present study.
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In addition, we find a slightly significant effect for Diff. Past Perf. Market-Num. in re-
gression 4 if we run the regressions for all subjects. However, this result is not very stable
as Diff. Past Perf. Market-Num. is not a significant determinant of Diff. Risk Taking if
we re-run the regression only for those subjects that participated in all three surveys.
Insert table 5 here
After having analyzed which factors drive changes in risk taking behavior from Septem-
ber to December and from December to March jointly, we turn to analyze this question
separately for the two time periods. Table 6 reports results of simple tobit regression of
changes in risk taking (Diff. Risk Taking) on various independent variables. All odd num-
bered models run the regressions for all difference variables in the time period September
to December, whereas all even numbered models run the regressions for all difference vari-
ables in the time period December to March. We run the regressions only for those subjects
that participated in all three surveys, i.e. for subjects for that we have an observation in
both time periods.
Our finding that changes in Diff. Risk Attitude 2 cannot explain changes in risk taking
remains stable. In addition, for regressions which rely on data that were collected in
September and December 2008 (1, 5, 7, and 9) we can also include Diff. Risk Attitude
6 and Diff. Risk Attitude 7 as additional independent variables. Both measures are also
not able to explain changes in risk taking. These results remain stable even if we run the
regressions for each risk attitude measure individually.
Interestingly, our result that changes in subjective market risk and return expectations can
best explain Diff. Risk Taking remains fairly stable even if we run the analyses for the two
subsample of observations separately. The coefficients for Diff. Market-Return-Subj. are
almost stable and between 2.7 and 3.7 and mostly significant. Lower levels of significance
can be driven by a lower number of observations. The results for Diff. Market-Risk-Subj.
are not as clear-cut. Diff. Market-Risk-Subj. is always negative, however, only significant
in odd-numbered regressions.
Why can changes in subjective risk expectations explain changes in risk taking only for the
period September to December but not for the one from December to March? We can only
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speculate about this. A possible explanation could be that changes in risk expectations
and subsequently changes in risk taking behavior are smaller and hardly existent in the
second period from December to March, whereas they are existent in the period September
to December, i.e. the period of large turmoils on financial markets.
Overall, all coefficients for Diff. Market-Return-Subj. and Diff. Market-Risk-Subj. point
into the correct direction, however, the significance of our results is lower than in table
5. A possible explanation for the lower significance are a lower number of observations in
the separated analyses.
Insert table 6 here
4.3 Overconfidence over Time
Besides changes in risk and return expectations there is also a large strand of literature
analyzing changes in the level of overconfidence over time. Gervais and Odean (2001)
illustrate in a theoretical model that investors often attribute success to their own acumen
while attributing failure to chance and term this “learning to be overconfident”. This self-
serving attribution bias results in subjects getting more overconfident after investment
success and subsequently taking more risky actions but not more underconfident after
investment failure. In the long run, however, frequent feedback lowers the self attribution
bias and subjects get less overconfident. In line with the self attribution hypothesis, Barber
and Odean (2002) and Statman et al. (2006) show that overconfidence varies with prior
past performance.
Experimental evidence on the evolution of overconfidence is equivocal. Deaves et al. (2005)
find evidence for the “learning to be overconfident” hypothesis whereas Jonsson and All-
wood (2003) find evidence for individual stability of overconfidence over time. To analyze
the question whether overconfidence is stable or varies over time in more depth we compare
the level of overconfidence (miscalibration) on an individual level in September, December,
and March with each other using a confidence interval approach. Following the two-point
approximation methodology suggested by Keefer and Bodily (1983) we transform esti-
mates of confidence intervals, i.e. upper and lower bounds, into volatility estimates. To
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get a measure of overconfidence we simply compare the estimated volatility with a volatil-
ity benchmark: Overconfidence = − Estimated volatility
V olatility of the benchmark
. This overconfidence measure
enables us to analyze to what degree subjects adjusted their risk expectations in reaction
to changes on financial markets and is thus related to our analyses in the previous sub-
sections. Since we cannot calculate a volatility benchmark for each subject’s portfolio we
can only analyze individual overconfidence with regard to the market.
Our measure for estimated volatility is simply Market-Risk-Num. To obtain an adequate
measure for the volatility of the benchmark, the FTSE-All-Share we can use two ap-
proaches. First, we can try to calculate historical volatilities for the FTSE-All-Share and
relate these to the estimated volatilities (Market-Risk-Num.). However, one big disadvan-
tage of historical volatilities is that the results heavily depend upon the time span that
is used to calculate the historical volatility. This disadvantage is in particular severe due
to the extreme turmoils that financial markets around the world have been experiencing
between September and December. Second, we can use a measure of the implied volatility
of the British stock market embedded in prices of out of the money index call and put
options. However, there is no implied volatility index that is calculated for the FTSE-
All-Share but only one for the FTSE-100 (VFTSE-100). Since the correlation between
FTSE-All-Share and FTSE-100 is almost 1 (ρ > 0.99) we use the average VFTSE-100
levels for September 6-20 (0.15), December 6-20 (0.22), and March 21-30 (0.18) as our
volatility benchmarks. Thus, subjects who end up with an overconfidence score above -1
are overconfident whereas subjects with a score below -1 are underconfident.
As we have seen in table 3 our measure of estimated volatility (Market-Risk-Num.) in
September is substantially smaller than in December and March implying that subjects
adjusted their volatility estimates upwards. However, this adjustment of volatilities might
be perfectly rational as subjects correctly incorporated that markets became substan-
tially more risky over time. Our overconfidence measures which are simply the estimated
volatilities inferred from the bounds divided by the average implied volatility in Septem-
ber, December, and March and normalized by minus one control for possible changes in
the riskiness of the benchmark. We find mean overconfidence in September to be -0.36
(median=-0.31), mean overconfidence in December to be -0.34 (median=-0.28), and mean
overconfidence in March to be -0.4 (median=-0.38). All scores are significantly larger than
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-1 indicating that subjects tend to set too tight bounds and thus underestimate volatilities.
Testing for differences in the degree of overconfidence between the September and the De-
cember wave we find no statistically significant difference using a Wilcoxon signed-rank
test (p=0.28). Subjects correctly adjusted their volatility estimates upwards in reaction to
the dramatic changes on financial markets. A similar result has been indirectly observed
by Glaser and Weber (2005) in their analyses of DAX volatility forecasts before and after
9/11. However, analyzing the differences in the degree of overconfidence between March
and December we find a significantly lower level of overconfidence in March than in De-
cember (p=0.002). Our results do not change if we control for subjects’ past performance
in the analyses.
Hence, the level of overconfidence remains fairly stable from September to December,
i.e. in the phase of a huge downturn, and gets smaller from December to March. Why
can we not find evidence for a self-serving attribution bias and thus initial increases in
overconfidence after investment success and later on a reduction in overconfidence as
subjects gain experience as proposed in the model of Gervais and Odean (2001)? The
reason might simply be the fact that there is hardly any investment success in the first
period from September to December. More than 87% of all investors state they did not
have a positive portfolio return between September and December. Thus, overconfidence
remains fairly stable initially before a slight learning effect sets in. However, to analyze
the dynamics of overconfidence in more depth we would need more observations over time.
5 Conclusion
Based on a repeated survey study that was run in collaboration with Barclays Wealth we
document that real online broker customers’ risk taking or investment behavior changes
substantially from one quarter to the other. According to more general risk-value models
these changes can be attributed to changes in expectations or changes in risk attitudes
or both. We show that expectations vary substantially over time whereas risk attitudes
seem to be fairly stable and do not vary too much over time. Furthermore, we show that
changes in risk taking behavior seem to be mainly driven by changes in expectations and
not changes in attitudes. This result is stable even if we control for past performance and
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demographics. Lastly, we provide evidence that overconfidence (miscalibration) of real
investors seems to be relatively stable from September to December 2008 and tends to
decrease slightly thereafter.
We extend previous findings in the literature on changes in risk taking, expectations, and
risk attitudes as follows: first, our unique dataset allows us to analyze changes in risk
taking, expectations, and risk attitudes of real online broker customers. Second, previous
studies in the literature analyze only changes in risk taking (see e.g. Malmendier and Nagel
(2008)) or only changes in expectations (see e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003)) or only changes
in risk attitudes (see e.g. Sahm (2007)) individually but not jointly. Thus, in contrast to
our study they are not able to disentangle the channel through which risk taking behavior
changes over time or they are not able to observe changes in risk taking behavior at all.
Third, a major advantage of our survey is that the first round of surveys was conducted in
the beginning of September 2008, i.e. just before the extreme turmoils recently experienced
in financial markets. Hence, we are able to analyze the effect of substantial stock price
drops on risk attitudes and expectations by comparing the expectations and attitudes
shortly before the crisis and during the crisis using the same panel of investors. Fourth,
our dataset is the first one that allows us to test predictions in the study by Gervais and
Odean (2001) on the stability of overconfidence with real investors where one is able to
control for previous investment success.
Our findings should be valuable for practitioners in banking. We show that risk attitudes
- if measured correctly and without confounding effects - seem to be fairly stable and
that changes in risk taking behavior seem to be caused by changes in expectations and
not by changes in risk attitudes or changes in past performance. Thus, practitioners who
are urged by MiFID (2006) to elicit their customers’ risk profiles and risk preferences
can argue that elicitation of risk attitudes needs not to be carried out on a quarterly
basis. Moreover, our results indicate that it might be worthwhile for practitioners to elicit
their clients’ expectations as they seem to underestimate the volatility of the market
substantially and as this underestimation seems to persist over time.
Future research could combine repeatedly elicited survey data with data on portfolio
holdings and trading activity and thus extend findings in previous studies who analyze
the relationship between trading data and a one-time survey (see Dorn and Huberman
30
(2005) and Glaser and Weber (2007)). Moreover, it seems interesting to analyze whether
the extreme events in financial markets in recent months have long-lasting effects on risk
attitudes and expectations as well as on the actual asset allocations of economic agents.
31
References
Alwin, D. F., and J. A. Krosnick, 1991, “The Reliability of Survey Attitude Measure-
ment: The Influence of Question and Respondent Attributes,” Sociological Methods &
Research, 20, 139–181.
Andersen, S., G. W. Harrison, M. I. Lau, and E. E. Rutstro¨m, 2008, “Lost in State Space:
Are Preferences Stable?,” International Economic Review, 49, 1091–1112.
Barber, B. M., and T. Odean, 2002, “Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First?,” Review
of Financial Studies, 15, 455–487.
Baucells, M., and A. Villasis, 2006, “Stability of Risk Preference and the Reflection Effect
of Prospect Theory,” Working Paper.
Ben-David, I., J. R. Graham, and C. Harvey, 2007, “Managerial Overconfidence and
Coporate Policies,” Working Paper.
Bollen, K. A., and K. H. Barb, 1981, “Pearson’s R and Coarsely Categorized Measures,”
American Sociological Review, 46, 232–239.
Brooks, P., G. B. Davies, and D. P. Egan, 2008, “Linking Psychometrically Measured
Risk Tolerance with Choice Behaviour,” Working Paper.
Brunnermeier, M. K., and S. Nagel, 2008, “Do Wealth Fluctuations Generate Time-
Varying Risk Aversion? Micro-Evidence on Individuals’ Asset Allocation,” American
Economic Review, 98, 713–736.
Camerer, C. F., 1989, “An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories,”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 61–104.
Cicchetti, D. V., D. Showalter, and P. J. Tyrer, 1985, “The Effect of Number of Rat-
ing Scale Categories on Levels of Interrater Reliability: A Monte Carlo Investigation,”
Applied Psychological Measurement, 9, 31–36.
Deaves, R., E. Lu¨ders, and M. Schro¨der, 2005, “The Dynamics of Overconfidence: Evi-
dence from Stock Market Forecasters,” Working Paper.
DeBondt, W. F. M., 2000, The Psychology of Underreaction and Overreaction in World
Equity Markets. in: Security Market Imperfections in World Wide Equity Markets,
edited by: D. B. Keim and W. T. Ziemba, Cambridge University Press.
32
Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2008, “In turbulenten Zeiten - Aktiona¨rszahlen ru¨ckla¨ufig,”
DAI-Kurzstudie 2 - 2008, pp. 1–2.
Dominitz, J., and C. F. Manski, 2005, “Measuring and Interpreting Expectations of Equity
Returns,” Working Paper.
, 2007, “Expected Equity Returns and Portfolio Choice: Evidence from the Health
and Retirement Study,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 5, 369–379.
Dorn, D., and G. Huberman, 2005, “Talk and Action: What Individual Investors Say and
What They Do,” Review of Finance, 9, 437–481.
Fisher, K. L., and M. Statman, 2002, “Blowing Bubbles,” Journal of Psychology and
Financial Markets, 3, 53–65.
Gervais, S., and T. Odean, 2001, “Learning to Be Overconfident,” Review of Financial
Studies, 14, 1–27.
Glaser, M., T. Langer, and M. Weber, 2007, “Overconfidence of Professionals and Laymen:
Individual Differences Within and Between Tasks?,” Working Paper.
Glaser, M., and M. Weber, 2005, “September 11 and Stock Return Expectations of Indi-
vidual Investors,” Review of Finance, 9, 243–279.
, 2007, “Overconfidence and Trading Volume,” Geneva Risk and Insurance Review,
32, 1–36.
Graham, J. R., and C. Harvey, 2005, “The Long-Run Equity Risk Premium,” Finance
Research Letters, 2, 185–194.
Guiso, L., M. Haliassos, and T. Jappelli, 2003, “Household Stockholding in Europe: Where
Do We Stand and Where Do We Go?,” Working Paper.
Harrison, G. W., E. Johnson, M. M. McInnes, and E. E. Rutstro¨m, 2005, “Temporal
Stability of Estimates of Risk Aversion,” Applied Financial Economics Letters, 1, 31–
35.
Hey, J. D., and C. Orme, 1994, “Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory
Using Experimental Data,” Econometrica, 62, 1291–1326.
33
Holt, C. A., and S. K. Laury, 2002, “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects,” American
Economic Review, 92, 1644–1655.
Jia, J., J. S. Dyer, and J. C. Butler, 1999, “Measures of Perceived Risk,” Management
Science, 45, 519–532.
Jonsson, A.-C., and C. M. Allwood, 2003, “Stability and Variability in the Realism of
Confidence Judgments over Time, Content Domain, and Gender,” Personality and In-
dividual Differences, 34, 559–574.
Keefer, D. L., and S. E. Bodily, 1983, “Three-Point Approximations for Continuous Ran-
dom Variables,” Management Science, 29, 595–609.
Klos, A., 2008, “Retail Banking, the Central Tendency Error, and the Temporal Stability
of Risk Preferences,” Working Paper.
Lintner, J., 1965, “The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 47, 13–37.
Loewenstein, G. F., E. U. Weber, C. K. Hsee, and N. Welch, 2001, “Risks as Feelings,”
Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267–286.
Malmendier, U., and S. Nagel, 2008, “Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences
Affect Risk-Taking?,” Working Paper.
Manski, C. F., 2005, “Measuring Expectations,” Econometrica, 72, 1329–1376.
Markowitz, H., 1952, “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of Finance, 7, 77–91.
Mellers, B. A., A. Schwartz, and E. U. Weber, 1997, Do Risk Attitudes Reflect in the Eye
of the Beholder? in: Choice, Decision, and Measurement: Essays in Honor of R. Duncan
Luce, edited by: A. J. J. Marley, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Merton, R. C., 1973, “An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model,” Econometrica, 41,
867–887.
Miller, E. M., 1977, “Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion,” Journal of Finance,
32, 1151–1168.
New York Times, September 17, 2008, “Financial Crisis Enters New Phase,” .
34
Nosic´, A., and M. Weber, 2007, “How Risky Do I Invest: The Role of Risk Attitudes, Risk
Perceptions and Overconfidence,” Working Paper.
Odean, T., 1998, “Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?,” Journal of Finance,
53, 1775–1798.
Preston, C. C., and A. M. Colman, 2000, “Optimal Number of Response Categories in
Rating Scales: Reliability, Validity, Discriminating Power, and Respondent Preferences,”
Acta Psychologica, 104, 1–15.
Ricciardi, V., 2004, “A Risk Perception Primer: A Narrative Research Review of the
Risk Perception Literature in Behavioral Accounting and Behavioral Finance,” Working
Paper.
Sahm, C. R., 2007, “Does Risk Tolerance Change?,” Working Paper.
Sarin, R., and M. Weber, 1993, “Risk-Value Models,” European Journal of Operational
Research, 70, 135–149.
Sharpe, W. F., 1964, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Con-
ditions of Risk,” Journal of Finance, 19, 425–442.
Shiller, R. J., F. Kon-Ya, and Y. Tsutsui, 1996, “Why Did the Nikkei Crash? Expanding
the Scope of Expectations Data Collection,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 78,
156–164.
Statman, M., S. Thorley, and K. Vorkink, 2006, “Investor Overconfidence and Trading
Volume,” Review of Financial Studies, 19, 1531–1565.
Staw, B. M., 1976, “Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment
to a Chosen Course of Action,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16,
27–44.
Thaler, R. H., and E. J. Johnson, 1990, “Gambling with the House Money and Trying to
Break Even: The Effect of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice,” Management Science, 36,
643–660.
The European Parliament and the European Council, 2004, Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive. Directive 2004/39/EC.
35
, 2006, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive: Implementing Directive.
Comission Directive 2006/73/EC.
Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2003, “Perspectives on Behavioral Finance: Does ”Irrationality”
Disappear with Wealth? Evidence from Expectations and Actions,” NBER Macroeco-
nomics Annual, pp. 139–208.
Viswanathan, M., S. Sudman, and M. Johnson, 2004, “Maximum versus Meaningful Dis-
crimination in Scale Response: Implications for Validity of Measurement of Consumer
Perceptions about Products,” Journal of Business Research, 57, 108–124.
Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2008, “Stock Investors Lose Faith, Pull Out Record
Amounts,” .
Weber, E. U., 1997, The Utility of Measuring and Modeling Perceived Risk. in: Choice,
Decision, and Measurement: Essays in Honor of R. Duncan Luce, edited by: A. J. J.
Marley, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Weber, E. U., and R. A. Milliman, 1997, “Perceived Risk Attitudes: Relating Risk Per-
ception to Risky Choice,” Management Science, 43, 123–144.
Weber, M., and C. F. Camerer, 1998, “The Disposition Effect in Securities Trading: An
Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 33, 167–184.
Weber, M., and H. Zuchel, 2005, “How Do Prior Outcomes Affect Risk Attitude? Com-
paring Escalation of Commitment and the House Money Effect,” Decision Analysis, 2,
30–43.
Weng, L.-J., 2004, “Impact of the Number of Response Categories and Anchor Labels on
Coefficient Alpha and Test-Retest Reliability,” Educational and Psychological Measure-
ment, 64, 956–972.
36
T
ab
le
1:
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
an
d
de
sc
ri
pt
iv
e
st
at
is
ti
cs
T
h
e
fi
rs
t
tw
o
co
lu
m
n
s
o
f
th
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
m
ea
n
v
a
lu
es
o
f
v
a
ri
o
u
s
d
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s
a
n
d
d
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
o
f
o
u
r
st
u
d
y
(G
ro
u
p
a
ll
)
a
n
d
fo
r
th
e
a
d
u
lt
B
ri
ti
sh
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
(G
B
a
ll
)
(G
B
a
ll
d
a
ta
a
re
su
p
p
li
ed
th
ro
u
g
h
th
e
O
ffi
ce
fo
r
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
.
T
h
e
n
ex
t
th
re
e
co
lu
m
n
s
re
p
o
rt
m
ea
n
v
a
lu
es
o
f
v
a
ri
o
u
s
d
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s
a
n
d
d
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
a
su
b
se
t
o
f
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
th
a
t
to
o
k
p
a
rt
in
a
ll
th
re
e
su
rv
ey
s
o
n
ly
o
n
ce
(G
ro
u
p
o
n
c
e
),
o
n
ly
tw
ic
e
(G
ro
u
p
tw
ic
e
)
o
r
in
a
ll
th
re
e
su
rv
ey
s
(G
ro
u
p
th
r
ic
e
),
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
.
A
ge
,
N
u
m
be
r
o
f
d
ep
en
d
a
n
ts
,
a
n
d
G
ro
ss
in
co
m
e
a
re
se
lf
-e
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
.
G
en
d
er
a
n
d
M
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s
a
re
tw
o
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
th
a
t
ta
k
e
th
e
v
a
lu
e
1
if
th
e
su
b
je
ct
is
m
a
le
a
n
d
m
a
rr
ie
d
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
In
v
es
ta
b
le
w
ea
lt
h
is
m
ea
su
re
d
in
9
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
fr
o
m
1
(£
0
-
£
1
0
,0
0
0
)
to
9
(>
£
1
m
il
li
o
n
).
T
h
e
la
st
th
re
e
co
lu
m
n
s
re
p
o
rt
z-
sc
o
re
s
o
f
M
a
n
n
-W
h
it
n
ey
ra
n
k
-s
u
m
te
st
s
o
r
b
in
o
m
ia
l
te
st
s
(f
o
r
th
e
tw
o
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s)
w
h
ic
h
te
st
w
h
et
h
er
su
b
je
ct
s
th
a
t
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
te
d
o
n
ce
,
tw
ic
e
o
r
th
ri
ce
d
iff
er
fr
o
m
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
su
b
g
ro
u
p
o
f
su
b
je
ct
s.
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
a
n
d
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
.
G
ro
u
p
a
ll
G
B
a
ll
G
ro
u
p
o
n
c
e
G
ro
u
p
tw
ic
e
G
ro
u
p
th
r
ic
e
D
iff
.t
w
ic
e
−
o
n
c
e
D
iff
.t
h
r
ic
e
−
o
n
c
e
D
iff
.t
h
r
ic
e
−
tw
ic
e
A
g
e
5
1
.6
5
4
7
.6
6
5
1
.6
9
5
0
.5
2
5
2
.9
6
-0
.6
6
7
1
.0
8
2
1
.5
9
5
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
ep
en
d
en
ts
1
.1
4
-
1
.1
7
1
.1
3
1
.0
8
-0
.3
2
8
-0
.3
0
9
0
.0
5
6
G
en
d
er
0
.9
3
0
.4
9
0
.9
2
0
.9
3
0
.9
5
0
.6
7
4
0
.2
3
8
0
.4
5
3
G
ro
ss
in
co
m
e
7
6
,6
1
5
.7
3
3
0
,0
0
0
7
1
,4
4
6
.5
9
8
5
,7
1
8
.9
2
7
6
,6
3
1
.4
1
.1
5
7
0
.9
0
2
-0
.2
0
7
M
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s
0
.6
5
0
.5
2
0
.6
7
0
.6
5
0
.6
2
0
.6
4
7
0
.3
1
4
0
.6
0
1
In
v
es
ta
b
le
w
ea
lt
h
4
.8
0
-
4
.5
8
4
.5
2
5
.5
5
1
.0
8
2
3
.6
6
0
*
*
3
.4
8
8
*
*
37
T
ab
le
2:
D
efi
ni
ti
on
of
dy
na
m
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
ze
s
a
n
d
d
efi
n
es
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
th
a
t
w
er
e
el
ic
it
ed
re
p
ea
te
d
ly
.
N
o
te
th
a
t
R
is
k
A
tt
it
u
d
e
6
a
n
d
R
is
k
A
tt
it
u
d
e
7
w
er
e
n
o
t
el
ic
it
ed
in
th
e
M
a
rc
h
su
rv
ey
.
V
a
r
ia
b
le
Q
u
e
st
io
n
/
D
e
sc
r
ip
ti
o
n
R
is
k
T
a
k
in
g
R
is
k
T
a
ki
n
g
M
ea
su
re
s,
o
n
a
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
es
b
a
si
s,
th
e
(h
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l)
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
m
o
n
ey
a
n
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
is
w
il
li
n
g
to
in
v
es
t
in
to
th
e
F
T
S
E
-A
ll
-S
h
a
re
co
m
p
a
re
d
to
a
ri
sk
fr
ee
a
ss
et
w
it
h
a
4
%
re
tu
rn
.
(0
=
in
v
es
t
ev
er
y
th
in
g
in
to
th
e
ri
sk
fr
ee
a
ss
et
..
.
1
0
0
=
in
v
es
t
ev
er
y
th
in
g
in
to
th
e
ri
sk
y
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
)
R
is
k
A
tt
it
u
d
e
R
is
k
A
tt
it
u
d
e
2
”
It
is
li
k
el
y
I
w
o
u
ld
in
v
es
t
a
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
su
m
in
a
h
ig
h
ri
sk
in
v
es
tm
en
t.
”
(1
=
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
d
is
a
g
re
e
..
.
7
=
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
A
g
re
e)
R
is
k
A
tt
it
u
d
e
6
”
I
a
m
a
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
ri
sk
ta
k
er
.”
(1
=
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
d
is
a
g
re
e
..
.
7
=
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
A
g
re
e)
R
is
k
A
tt
it
u
d
e
7
”
E
v
en
if
I
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
d
a
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
lo
ss
o
n
a
n
in
v
es
tm
en
t,
I
w
o
u
ld
st
il
l
co
n
si
d
er
m
a
k
in
g
ri
sk
y
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
.”
(1
=
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
d
is
a
g
re
e
..
.
7
=
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
A
g
re
e)
E
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
M
a
rk
et
-R
et
u
rn
-N
u
m
.
M
ea
su
re
s
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
’
re
tu
rn
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
th
e
F
T
S
E
-A
ll
-S
h
a
re
in
3
m
o
n
th
s
in
p
er
ce
n
t
M
a
rk
et
-R
is
k-
N
u
m
.
M
ea
su
re
s
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
’
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
th
e
F
T
S
E
-A
ll
-S
h
a
re
in
3
m
o
n
th
s
b
y
tr
a
n
sf
o
rm
in
g
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
b
o
u
n
d
s
in
to
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
M
a
rk
et
-R
et
u
rn
-S
u
bj
.
”
H
o
w
w
o
u
ld
y
o
u
ra
te
th
e
re
tu
rn
s
y
o
u
ex
p
ec
t
fr
o
m
a
n
in
v
es
tm
en
t
in
th
e
U
K
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
(F
T
S
E
-A
ll
-
S
h
a
re
)
o
v
er
th
e
n
ex
t
3
m
o
n
th
s?
”
(1
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
b
a
d
..
.
7
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
g
o
o
d
)
M
a
rk
et
-R
is
k-
S
u
bj
.
”
O
v
er
th
e
n
ex
t
3
m
o
n
th
s,
h
o
w
ri
sk
y
d
o
y
o
u
th
in
k
th
e
U
K
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
(F
T
S
E
-A
ll
-
S
h
a
re
)
is
?
”
(1
=
N
o
t
ri
sk
y
a
t
a
ll
..
.
7
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
ri
sk
y
)
O
w
n
-R
et
u
rn
-N
u
m
.
M
ea
su
re
s
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
’
re
tu
rn
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
th
e
o
w
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
a
t
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
3
m
o
n
th
s
in
p
er
ce
n
t
O
w
n
-R
is
k-
N
u
m
.
M
ea
su
re
s
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
’
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
th
e
o
w
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
a
t
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
3
m
o
n
th
s
b
y
tr
a
n
sf
o
rm
in
g
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
b
o
u
n
d
s
in
to
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
O
w
n
-R
et
u
rn
-S
u
bj
.
”
H
o
w
w
o
u
ld
y
o
u
ra
te
th
e
re
tu
rn
s
y
o
u
ex
p
ec
t
fr
o
m
y
o
u
r
o
w
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
o
v
er
th
e
n
ex
t
3
m
o
n
th
s?
”
(1
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
b
a
d
..
.
7
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
g
o
o
d
)
O
w
n
-R
is
k-
S
u
bj
.
”
O
v
er
th
e
n
ex
t
3
m
o
n
th
s,
h
o
w
ri
sk
y
d
o
y
o
u
th
in
k
th
e
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
in
y
o
u
r
o
w
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
a
re
?
”
(1
=
N
o
t
ri
sk
y
a
t
a
ll
..
.
7
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
ri
sk
y
)
P
a
st
P
e
r
fo
r
m
a
n
c
e
P
er
f.
-E
xt
er
n
a
l
W
h
a
t
d
o
y
o
u
th
in
k
th
e
re
tu
rn
o
f
y
o
u
r
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
h
el
d
a
t
o
th
er
b
a
n
k
s
o
v
er
th
e
p
a
st
3
m
o
n
th
s
w
a
s?
P
er
f.
-M
a
rk
et
-N
u
m
.
”
W
h
a
t
is
y
o
u
r
b
es
t
es
ti
m
a
te
o
f
th
e
re
tu
rn
o
f
th
e
U
K
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
(F
T
S
E
-A
ll
-S
h
a
re
)
o
v
er
th
e
p
a
st
3
m
o
n
th
s?
”
P
er
f.
-M
a
rk
et
-S
u
bj
.
”
H
o
w
w
o
u
ld
y
o
u
ra
te
th
e
re
tu
rn
s
o
f
th
e
U
K
st
o
ck
m
a
rk
et
s
(F
T
S
E
-A
ll
-S
h
a
re
)
o
v
er
th
e
p
a
st
3
m
o
n
th
s?
”
(1
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
b
a
d
..
.
7
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
g
o
o
d
)
P
er
f.
-O
w
n
-N
u
m
.
”
W
h
a
t
d
o
y
o
u
th
in
k
th
e
re
tu
rn
o
f
y
o
u
r
o
w
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
o
v
er
th
e
p
a
st
3
m
o
n
th
s
w
a
s?
”
P
er
f.
-O
w
n
-S
u
bj
.
”
H
o
w
w
o
u
ld
y
o
u
ra
te
th
e
re
tu
rn
s
o
f
y
o
u
r
o
w
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
o
v
er
th
e
p
a
st
3
m
o
n
th
s?
”
(1
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
b
a
d
..
.
7
=
E
x
tr
em
el
y
g
o
o
d
)
38
Table 3: Differences in repeatedly elicited variables between rounds
This table reports mean values of all repeatedly elicited variables broken down by the month they were
elicited for all subjects that took part in the survey at least twice. The last two columns indicate z-statistics
of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests that test whether scores in December are significantly different from scores in
September (DifferenceDec−Sept) or whether scores in March are significantly different from scores in December
(DifferenceMarch−Dec). Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are only carried out if a subjects has participated in the
two respective months. * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Sept. Dec. March DifferenceDec−Sept DifferenceMarch−Dec
(N=265) (N=305) (N=239) z-score z-score
Risk Taking
Risk-Taking (Hypoth.) 56.02 52.77 46.52 -2.586** -3.90**
Risk Attitude
Risk Attitude 2 3.34 3.63 3.55 1.889 -0.731
Risk Attitude 6 4.43 4.61 - 2.511* -
Risk Attitude 7 5.04 5.06 - 0.388 -
Expectations
Market-Return-Num. 1.57 3.57 5.42 1.661 3.311**
Market-Risk-Num. 0.052 0.075 0.072 7.289** -0.568
Market-Return-Subj. 3.5 3.67 3.84 1.089 -0.478
Market-Risk-Subj. 4.76 5.17 5.15 4.596** 1.533
Own-Return-Num. 4.38 6.23 8.18 2.941** 3.324**
Own-Risk-Num. 0.053 0.078 0.067 6.737** -2.562**
Own-Return-Subj. 3.89 3.91 4.17 -1.092 2.599**
Own-Risk-Subj. 4.2 4.45 4.53 3.680** 1.287
Past Performance
Perf-Ext. -2.14 -12.57 -3.19 -7.406** 3.618**
Perf-Market-Num. -8.2 -16.79 -6.96 -8.198** 7.782**
Perf-Market-Subj. 2.32 1.82 2.42 -7.426** 4.641**
Perf-Own-Num. -7.7 -18.51 -8.48 -9.521** 7.03**
Perf-Own-Subj. 2.95 2.33 2.92 -7.256** 4.261**
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Table 4: Changes in risk taking I
This table reports mean values of changes in risk attitudes, expectations and past performance separately for
subjects who take more (less) risks in December compared to September in the left panel and for subjects who
take more (less) risks in March compared to December in the right panel: ∆ R.T.+ (∆ R.T.−). All change
or differences variables are calculated for each subject separately simply as the value in December minus the
value in September in the left panel and as the value in March minus the value in December in the right panel.
The last column in each panel reports z-scores of a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test comparing the two groups
of subjects. * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** indicates significance at the 1% level.
September to December December to March
Difference in Difference in
∆ R.T.+ ∆ R.T.− differences ∆ R.T.+ ∆ R.T.− differences
Risk Attitude
Diff. Risk Attitude 2 0.182 0.009 0.542 0.037 -0.093 1.192
Diff. Risk Attitude 6 -0.013 0.218 -1.232 - - -
Diff. Risk Attitude 7 0.026 -0.037 0.217 - - -
Expectations
Diff. Market-Return-Num. 0.937 3.945 -0.072 3.129 0.523 1.395
Diff. Market-Risk-Num. 0.022 0.029 -0.621 0.004 -0.008 1.565
Diff. Market-Return-Subj. 0.395 -0.027 2.024* 0.509 0.052 2.468*
Diff. Market-Risk-Subj. -0.052 0.555 -3.35** -0.200 0.020 -1.21
Diff. Own-Return-Num. 2.980 3.252 0.245 3.148 3.414 0.556
Diff. Own-Risk-Num. 0.034 0.019 0.929 0.002 -0.015 2.092*
Diff. Own-Return-Subj. -0.067 -0.018 0.041 0.296 0.021 1.332
Diff. Own-Risk-Subj. 0.240 0.321 -0.77 0.463 0.062 1.265
Past Performance
Diff. Past Perf. External -8.994 -14.83 0.556 5.571 4.467 0.152
Diff. Past Perf. Market Num. -11.835 -5.880 -1.418 9.037 10.097 -0.702
Diff. Past Perf. Market Subj. -0.697 -0.670 -0.174 0.352 0.680 -1.178
Diff. Past Perf. Self Num. -13.000 -12.893 0.596 11.602 8.908 0.403
Diff. Past Perf. Self Subj. -0.558 -0.873 1.482 0.741 0.144 2.375*
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Table 5: Changes in risk taking II
This table reports results of clustered tobit regressions where standard errors take clustering over subjects into
account. Dependent variable in each model is changes in risk taking (Diff. Risk Taking). Independent variables
are changes in: risk attitude, expectations, and past performance as well as demographic variables. All change
or differences variables are calculated for each subject separately simply as the value in December (March)
minus the value in September (December). p-values are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the
10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk Attitude
Diff. Risk Attitude 2 0.936 1.071 1.001 0.933
(0.220) (0.149) (0.216) (0.252)
Expectations
Diff. Market-Return-Num. 0.151 0.038
(0.256) (0.714)
Diff. Market-Risk-Num. 4.451 5.349
(0.870) (0.846)
Diff. Market-Return-Subj. 2.348 2.327 1.934 2.013
(0.017)** (0.018)** (0.049)** (0.046)**
Diff. Market-Risk-Subj. -2.208 -2.303 -2.529 -2.631
(0.016)** (0.015)** (0.010)** (0.009)***
Past Performance
Diff. Past Perf. Market Num. -0.164
(0.056)*
Diff. Past Perf. Market Subj. 0.137
(0.872)
Demographics No No No Yes Yes
Dummy-Period -2.124 -3.441 -2.978 -0.464 -3.489
(0.470) (0.242) (0.312) (0.886) (0.283)
Constant -4.366 -3.601 -3.803 4.694 5.478
(0.021)** (0.069)* (0.054)* (0.524) (0.468)
Observations 434 435 431 396 396
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